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CRIMINAL LAW
THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF POLICE CORRUPTION
HERBERT BEIGEL*
INTRODUCTION
Within the last few years there has been a
marked proliferation of federal investigations and
prosecutions of state and local officials for official
misconduct and corruption. So active has the
federal government become in investigating the
local political arena that state and city politicians
and police officers are being investigated, indicted
and often convicted for a wide variety of violations
of federal criminal statutes. Because this intense
interest in the affairs of local officials by federal
investigators is a relatively recent development,
little attention has been given to the changes in
the application of federal law, federal jurisdiction
and constitutional protections which have accom-
panied these investigations. Questions concerning
political motivations behind such federal incur-
sions into local affairs have also beclouded any
real attempt to delineate objectively the legal and
practical effects of investigations of local corrup-
tion.'
The purpose of this article is to focus on one
recent and controversial development-the in-
* B.A. 1966, Brandeis University; J.D. 1969, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania School of Law; Member of
District of Columbia and Illinois Bars.
Much of the factual material found in this article is
based on the author's tenure from September, 1970 to
November, 1972 with the Organized Crime and Rack-
eteering Section of the Criminal Division of the United
States Department of Justice. The views expressed in
this article are his own and do not necessarily coincide
with the views of officials of the Justice Department.
In addition, much of his time was spent with the Chi-
cago Strike Force, one of eighteen field offices of the
Racketeering Section and nothing in this article is
intended to reflect on any government lawyers or
personnel of agencies with whom he worked.
IDuring my assignment with the Chicago Strike
Force, I found little political influence in the investiga-
tions which I conducted, the enormity of the federal
bureaucracy effectively blunting any overt political
bias that might affect a decision on whether or not to
investigate local corruption. More particularly, the
experience of supervising an investigation of police
corruption led me to the conclusion that such investi-
gations were at least as much the product of "an idea
whose time has come" as they were the consequence of
any political bias.
vestigation and prosecution of police corruption.
This analysis will identify the specific methods
employed by federal prosecutors to subject local
police officials to federal prosecution, 2 thereby
offering insight into the intricacies of the investi-
gation of one governmental body by another. In
addition, the federal investigation of state and
local corruption has raised new questions about
the proper role of federal law enforcement. By
analyzing the problems which arise in one par-
ticular type of investigation, it will also be possible
to point out new ways in which to improve the
relations between state and federal agencies.
TYPES or PouIcE CoxupmnozN
Essentially, police corruption falls into two
major categories-external corruption, which con-
cerns police contacts with the public, and internal
corruption, which involves the relationships
among policemen within the workings of the
police department. The external corruption gen-
erally consists of one or more of the following
activities:
(1) Payoffs to police by essentially non-criminal
elements who fail to comply with stringent statutes
or city ordinances; or, payoffs by those in parti-
cular need of police protection, who are willing
to pass money to individual officers or groups of
officers (for example, businessmen dispensing liq-
uor, businessmen located in high crime areas, in-
dividuals operating any type of business requiring
a license, automobile towing operations, attorneys
who represent those guilty of minor violations of
the law where police testimony constitutes most
2 Since the authority or jurisdiction of any single
police department is confined to a single jurisdiction
within a state, it traditionally has been assumed that
the investigation and elimination of police corruption
should be left to the state. That such enforcement
rarely happens may be explained by any one of the
following: (1) One cannot effectively investigate him-
self; (2) Local government officials are themselves pay-
ing the police for favors; and (3) The citizenry largely
acqueses in and enjoys the favors and leniency granted
by the police who can be bought.
'5
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of the state's case, and individuals who repeatedly
violate the traffic laws).
(2) Payoffs to police by individuals who con-
tinually violate the law as a method of making
money (for example, prostitutes, narcotics addicts
and pushers, and professional burglars).
(3) "Clean Graft" where money is paid to police
for services, or where courtesy discounts are given
as a matter of course to the police.
These manifestations of external corruption
often follow the established hierarchial structure
of the police department. For example, a tavern
owner who wishes to avoid arrest by members of
a vice squad investigating violations of the liquor
laws must be assured that his payments to a single
officer will guarantee that the recipient either has
the power to direct other officers not to bother
the tavern owner or shares the money with those
who have command responsibilities. For this rea-
son, the payment of money to the police by busi-
nessmen, who are particularly vulnerable to arrest
for minor statutory violations, generally assumes
a highly organized structure of distribution. Where
the method of distributing the proceeds of collec-
tion becomes too burdensome, a more sophisticated
method may develop. A commander of a district,
who knows that collections can easily be extracted
from tavern owners, may simply charge an officer
who wants to be assigned to the vice squad a fixed
fee per month regardless of the amount actually
collected. Similarly, those in charge of appointing
commanders of districts may extract a monthly
charge in exchange for awarding that position.
Sophisticated methods of corruption also exist
where the police receive money from organized
crime. Because large scale bookmaking, narcotics
peddling and other forms of organized criminal
activity are highly structured, payments to the
police tend to be highly organized. Thus, protec-
tion for a syndicate's numerous wire rooms in a
district might require payments to the commander
who will direct his subordinates not to harass
certain establishments. The commander will either
have to pay his officers or allow them to keep a
portion of the proceeds which they collect.
In all cases of external police corruption, pro-
tection is the service bestowed, either in overlook-
ing violations of the law or in providing some addi-
tional police aid or assistance. Because the police
have broad discretion in enforcing the law, the
establishment of an organized system of corruption
does not require extensive covert activity. As long
as those who pay are satisfied with the service,
exposure is unlikely.
Internal corruption exists as a result of a desire
of individual officers to improve their working con-
ditions or to achieve higher status in the police
department. It may include:
(1) Payment of money to join the police force.
(2) Payment of money to higher ranking officers
for better shifts or assignments.
(3) Payment for choice vacation time.
(4) Strict adherence to a code of silence con-
cerning external police corruption.
(5) Payment for promotions.
(6) Payment for an assignment which will yield
lucrative kick-backs.
Most types of internal corruption seldom are
publicized and usually are not the subject of fed-
eral prosecution. However, because they are often
interdependent, the elimination of external corrup-
tion may have the effect of eliminating many
forms of internal police corruption. Thus, wide-
spread investigations and prosecutions of external
police corruption may have a potentially signifi-
cant impact on all aspects of police corruption.
FEDERAL AumHORITY FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF POLICE CORRUPTION
A. Tie Hobbs Act
Although Congress has recently passed legisla-
tion which authorizes federal investigative and
prosecutorial efforts against police corruption in
the area of organized gambling,3 the most signifi-
318 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970), enacted as part of the Or-
ganized Crime and Control Act of 1970. This statute
expanded federal jurisdiction over gambling activities
by proscribing the conduct of an illegal gambling busi-
ness under state law by five or more persons and which
grossed $2000 in any single day, or remained in sub-
stantially continuous operation for a period in excess of
thirty days, whether or not the business involved any
interstate activity. At the same time, and as part of the
same Organized Crime Act of 1970, Congress enacted
another statute which incorporates within the illegal
gambling business ambit of section 1955 state officials
who either through official acquiescence or active par-
ticipation facilitate the gambling business, although
only the enforcement of state laws may thus be ob-
structed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970).
Although couched in terms of obstruction of justice,
section 1511 was a congressional response to the con-
siderable amount of evidence that intrastate gambling
flourishes inpart because of protection payments made
to police and other local officials. Despite the congres-
sional initiative, the utility of these statutes in efforts
against police corruption is still in doubt. Numerous
factors contribute to the failure of these laws to be used
effectively. First, there is difficulty in establishing the
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cant enlargement of federal powers and jurisdiction
has come through expanded use of a well en-
trenched federal statute known as the Hobbs Act.
This statute provides in part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery
or extortion or attempts or conspires to do so, or
commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or pur-
pose to do anything in violation of this section shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful
taking or obtaining of personal property from the
person or in the presence of another, against his
will, by means of actual or threatened force, or
violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to
his person or property, or property in his custody
or possession, or the person or property of a relative
or member of his family or of anyone in his com-
pany at the time of the taking or obtaining.
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining
of property from another, with his consent, induced
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force vio-
lence, or fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term "commerce" means commerce
within the District of Columbia, or any Territory
or Possession of the United States; all commerce
"five person" requirement of section 1955, especially
in light of the limiting construction given that statute
by some courts. See United States v. Harris, 460 F.2d
1041 (5th Cir. 1972)(holding that low level employees
are not "conducting"); United States v. Riehl, 460
F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that customers do not
fall within the purview of the statute but street level
employees do). But see United States v. Mainello, 345
F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Second, successful in-
vestigations under sections 1955 and 1511 often in-
volve court authorized wiretapping which havemet with
serious difficulties in recent years due to non-compliance
with the statutes' procedural requirements. See United
States v. Giodano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1973); United States v. Becker,
461 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1972). See also United States v.
Chavez, 478 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Roberts, 477 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
King, 472 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972). Third, federaljudges probably have not always been enthusiastic
about cases brought under these statutes which some-
times involve as many as thirty defendants in a single
case and require extensive pretrial work. Fourth, there
is undoubtedly the realization that evidence of payoffs
to police is found not through wiretapping or testimony
of conventional witnesses, but only through informants
who are not willing to testify in court. Finally, there is
also the traditional reluctance of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to employ undercover agents who
would have the opportunity to obtain direct and usable
evidence of police and official corruption.
between any point in a State, Territory, Posses-
sion, or the District of Columbia and any point
outside thereof; all commerce between points with-
in the same State through any place outside such
State; and all other commerce over which
the United States has jurisdiction.4
Two elements of the Hobbs Act are relevant to
an investigation of police corruption: (1) the
meaning of extortion; and (2) the commerce re-
quirement. The following examples will illustrate
their importance.
An officer observes a youth leaving a tavern
with beer. He stops the boy and checks his iden-
tification which shows him to be under the legal
age for purchasing alcoholic beverages. The officer
then escorts the youth into the bar, confronts the
owner or the bartender with the apparent viola-
tion, and receives an admission that he should not
have sold the beer. The officer finds a private
corner of the tavern to discuss the matter further
with the bartender or owner and, being very care-
ful not to be overheard, says,
"What are you going to about this? You could
lose your license."
"How about if I give you $100."
"That's not enough. I have others to take care
of, you know."
"I'll give you $300."
"O0.K."J
The officer accepts the $300 and releases the minor
without making any arrest. He does not file a
report of the incident, although police regulations
require a report whether or not an arrest is made. 5
Or, a police officer may enter a tavern to check
the patrons' identifications and the owner uses
this occasion to complain that his customers' cars,
which are parked outside in a no parking zone, are
constantly being ticketed or towed away. "This
hurts my business" explains the tavern owner.
The owner also tells the officer that the constant
checking of identification by him and other mem-
bers of the vice squad drives customers away. The
officer listens to the complaints and the following
exchange takes place:
"Why not cut out all this nonsense?"
'How much will it cost me?"
4 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
6This incident is paraphrased from the court records
and trial testimony in United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d
233 (7th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Pacente 490
F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1973).
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$50 a month and you won't have any problems."
"O.K.6
Whether these practices constitute extortion
under the Hobbs Act and whether there is the
requisite effect on commerce are the crucial prob-
lems facing the prosecutor who wishes to proceed
against these officers. In analyzing the Hobbs Act,
it must be emphasized that the fear, if any, which
is felt by the tavern owner relates directly and
solely to the enforcement or non-enforcement of
the law by the police. In both examples the victims
were concerned that the law would be enforced.
Naturally, the tavern owner concludes that he
would be better off paying the police and avoiding
arrest or what he conceives to be unnecessary
harassment. Hence, once the bar owner receives
the slightest indication that the officer is willing to
make a deal, he will often conclude that the pay-
ment of money is the only practical solution.
The expanding concept of what constitutes ex-
tortion by a public official under the Hobbs Act
has largely been led by the Courts of Appeals for
the Third and Fifth Circuits, whose opinions have
encouraged prosecutors, with the support of trial
courts throughout the country, to begin investiga-
tions of the activities of local officials. In United
States v. Hyde7 the attorney general of Alabama,
his assistant, and a political supporter were in-
dicted under the Hobbs Act. In substance they
were charged with extorting money from life in-
surance companies and small loan companies in
Alabama. In return for paying money to the de-
fendants, the insurance companies were assured
that the attorney general would refrain from en-
forcing the state securities laws while the loan
companies were given assurances that they would
not be sued for charging illegally high interest
rates.8 Because of the evident willingness of the
6This incident is adapted and modified from the
records and trial testimony in United States v. DeMet,
486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973). Conversations like those
quoted occur in an almost endless myriad of factual
contexts ranging from an officer who approaches a
businessman for monthly payments in exchange for
adequate police service to an officer receiving money
from individuals engaged in serious criminal activities
(for example, narcotics or robbery offenses). The essence
of external police corruption, however, is always the
same and focuses on the willingness of the victim to pay
money in exchange for either protection or favors.
7 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1058 (1972).
8 Some of the evidence produced at the trial indi-
cated that, even where the attorney general was re-
quired by law to disapprove an improper sale of securi-
ties or to file suit against a loan company, he would
refrain from taking any action if paid money by the
company involved. Id. at 821.
insurance companies and loan companies to pay
money to the defendants to avoid being subjected
to sanctions for their unlawful conduct, the de-
fendants vigorously argued that the payment of
money by the companies was bribery and there-
fore outside the scope of the Hobbs Act.9 The
court, however, rejected the defendants' argu-
ments. In affirming the defendants' convictions,
the court assumed that the payors' satisfaction
with the results obtained was irrelevant and con-
cluded:
Threatening to take official action-even where it
is action that the official is duty bound to take-
for the purpose of coercing the victim to pay the
officials is extortion. 0
Although the court did not discard the "threat"
requirement, it required a threat no more explicit
than the belief by the victim that unless he paid
the money the official would enforce the law. The
absence of reliance by the court on an explicit
threat theory of extortion is repeatedly demon-
strated by the court's willingness to overlook the
lack of evidence of threats or coercion on some of
the payments made by the companies:.
5 If the conduct were considered bribery, the de-
fendants would not be subject to indictment under any
federal statute, except perhaps income tax evasion if
the money was received ana not reported. Why the
Hobbs Act included extortion but not bribery is an
open question, but the answer is no doubt partially due
to the fact that the Hobbs Act came into being in
response to labor unrest and violence, rather than any
need to reach all instances involving the payment of
money to public officials. For a detailed survey of the
history and background of the Hobbs Act, see Stem,
Prosecutions of Local Corruption Under the Hobbs Act:
The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Ex-
tortion, 3 SEToN HALL L. REv. 1 (1971).
10 448 F.2d at 832. See also United States v. Sopher,
362 F.2d 523 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966),
which involved the kickbacks to a public official for
construction contracts. The court did not discuss the
distinction between bribery and extortion where a
public official is concerned.
1In this context the court quoted with approval a
definition of extortion proposed by the Drafters of the
MODEL PENAL. CoDE which reads:
The threatened harm need not be 'unlawful.' The
actor may be privileged or even duty bound to
inflict the harm which he threatens; yet if he em-
ploys the threat of harm to coerce a transfer of
property for his own benefit he clearly belongs
among those to whom theft sanctions should be
applied. The case of the policeman who is under a
duty to make an arrest illustrates this point. His
threat to arrest unless the arrestee pays him money
is clearly extortionate although the policeman
would be derelict if he did not arrest.
448 F.2d at 833, n.27. The textual examples of police
corruption demonstrate that an official commits extor-
tion when he uses the power of his office and the vic-




The jury could infer that these people knew of the
general pattern of extortion and sought out Hyde
with the knowledge that they would have to deal
with him eventually in order to get these issues
approved. Even if these persons were not coerced,
that is, they were really bribes, the jury could find
that other payments were made by the victims
coerced into paying extortion.u2
Although the court failed to clarify what degree of
coercion should be required to elevate bribery into
extortion, it did attempt to draw a distinction
based on who initiated the discussions which led
to the payments. In effect, this limits extortion
to instances where the public official seeks out the
victim:
The distinction from bribery is therefore the initia-
tive and purpose on the part of the official and the
fear and lack of voluntariness on the part of the vic-
tim.P
The court did not explicitly define "voluntari-
ness." Instead, it recognized that, because the
victim's "fear" emerges from knowing that the
law will be enforced unless money is paid, only
the most ambiguous approach by the official is
needed to give the victim the knowledge that a
payment will be accepted and will have the de-
sired effect. Indeed, one can argue that the official's
mere acceptance of money constitutes extortion.
To accept that position would, of course, eliminate
any distinction between the concepts of bribery
and extortion. Hyde did not reach this question,
but simply concluded that once the official accepts
the money the jury must decide whether the pay-
ment was made as a result of bribery or extortion.
The inherent difficulty in distinguishing between
bribery and distinction renders the charge to the
jury based on Hyde extremely beneficial to the
prosecution. The natural reluctance of a defendant
to argue "Acquit me because it's bribery, not
extortion" combined with the current appeal of
public corruption cases makes the prosecution's
task much easier. Once a case goes to the jury,
any esoteric differences between extortion and
bribery will probably have little effect on the
final result. For this reason, Hyde, in not deciding
as a matter of law whether the officials charged
committed extortion or bribery, anticipates the
death knell of any meaningful defense based on
the theory that what was committed was bribery,
not extortion. In two recent cases, the Court of
12 id. at 834.
11 Id. at 833.
Appeals for the Third Circuit has further hastened
that development.
In United States v. Addonizio4 fifteen individ-
uals, including the mayor of Newark, New Jersey,
were charged with extortion and conspiracy to
commit extortion. The extortion charges involved
kickbacks required to be paid to public officials
by contractors in return for the awarding of con-
tracts on public works buildings. 5 Neither the
trial court nor the court of appeals was troubled
by the lack of evidence of specific extortionate
threats directed at the victims. 16 In affirming the
convictions, the court of appeals held that the
issue of extortion was a jury question, since there
"could be extortion when contractors would suc-
cumb in advance to the pressure they knew would
be forthcoming." 17 In effect, the court held that
it was not error for a jury to find that extortion
was committed when there is evidence that a
businessman or a potential victim is aware that a
public official's inodus operandi is to refrain from
doing certain acts only when he is paid money.
Given this interpretation, it is difficult to conceive
of a clear cut example of payment of money to a
14451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936(1972).
' Id. at 55. According to one government witness, a
defendant had said:
Everybody in Newark pays 10% or they don't
work in and they don't get paid in Newark.
Id. One contractor also tried to reduce a 10 per cent
kickback to 5 per cent and was turned down. Id. There
was also some testimony involving physical force-
"You pay your ten per cent or I'll break your leg." Id.
at 57. But the overall scheme did not depend on such
threats but was a standardized method of doing busi-
ness. Contractors in Newark knew that in order to
obtain public business they would have to open up
their pockets to city officials. The function of the threat
was simply to keep the occasional straying contractor
inline.
16 The trial court had instructed the jury that "The
mere voluntary payment of money, unaccompanied by
any [fear] of economic loss, would not constitute extor-
tion." Id. at 78. Missing from this definition of extor-
tion is any reference to express threats. Instead, the
term "voluntariness" is considered adequate to fulfill
the function of satisfying the "threat" requirement of
the Hobbs Act. But lack of voluntariness, as shown by
Hyde, need not result from any express threat by the
public official, but can arise simply because the victim
knows that he is expected to pay. It now becomes pos-
sible to find extortionate activity even where the victim
first contacts the public official for the purpose of paying
him money if he does so in response to a belief (fear
under the Act) that otherwise he will be treated differ-
ently than those who pay. Although no court of appeals
has expressly held that a public official commits extor-
tion even when the victim does the soliciting, this con-
clusion is the logical consequence of connecting the
threat to the public office rather than to the person
holding that office.17 Id. at 73.
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public official which the Addonizio court would
rule as a matter of law to be bribery.18
In United States v. KenneyI9 the court of appeals
went even further and completely eliminated any
requirement of evidence of force, fear or duress.
Kenney involved the alleged extortion of money
from contractors by public officials. Where the
trial court in Addonizio had submitted the case to
the jury on a use of fear theory, the trial court in
Kenney added an instruction to the jury under
the "color of official right" clause of the Hobbs
Act.20 The court of appeals concluded that the
definitional elements of extortion in the Hobbs
Act were phrased in the disjunctive,2' and that
"under color of official right" does not require
proof of threats, fear or duress. The power of
office, which is the color of official right, is, ipso
facto, what constitutes coercion by a public offi-
cial.u
Is As the court of appeals noted, the Hobbs Act
definition of extortion wi lifted from a New York
statute. See McKnmy's STAT. ANN. § 155.05 (1971).
At least since 1942 the New York courts have distin-
guished bribery from extortion on the basis that bribery
is the paying of money to obtain influence over a public
official in the exercise of his duties, whereas extortion
involves payment for what the payor was legally en-
titled to anyway. See Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures,
22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (1942). Although
Addonizio cited Hornstein with approval, it does not
appear that the court accepted the New York courts'
distinction between bribery and extortion. Rather, it
relied strictly on a broad concept of voluntariness. See
Stem, Prosecution of Local Corruption Under the Hobbs
Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and
Extortion, 3 SETON IAn L. REv. 1 (1971).
19 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), as amended, 462 F.2d 1230
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
20 The relevant portion of the Hobbs Act reads:
The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of prop-
erty from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence,
or fear, or under color of official right. (emphasis
added).
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
21 According to the court:
The 'under color of official right' language plainly
is disjunctive. That part of the definition repeats
the common law definition of extortion, a crime
which could only be committed by a public official
and which did not require proof of threat, fear or
duress.
462 F.2d at 1229.
12 As a practical matter, it is not difficult for the
prosecution to mold testimony in any police corruption
case so that it reflects some action by the officer which
initiates discussion of the payment of money. Thus,
once threats, fear, or duress are eliminated as require-
ments, any police officer who takes money can probably
be prosecuted for extortion. And even where it is clear
that the victim has initiated the discussion leading to
the payment, Addonizio will still allow extortion to be
found if the victim reasonably thought that he might
as well raise the subject since he would eventually be
While these courts have expounded a liberal
interpretation of the Hobbs Act, these three cases
do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that ex-
tortion under the Hobbs Act now encompasses
every type of payoff arrangement. Nowhere in
Kenney is there any discussion of the Hyde require-
ment of initiation by the public official, although
the Addonizio court stated that payments made in
response to the feeling of the inevitability of a
demand constituted extortion. Inasmuch as Ad-
donizio and Kenney involved the payments of
money to public officials as part of a widespread
kickback practice, the question whether the public
official must initiate the practice was not actually
resolved by the Third Circuit and still remains a
possible defense under these interpretations of the
Hobbs Act.
28
asked. A good example of this is a tavern owner who
seeks to join a "club" to pay officers not to come to his
bar and check identifications, and to provide expedited
service. See United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979
(N.D. Ill. 1973). Other courts have dealt with extortion
by public officials but have relied on the traditional
requirements of threat and duress. See United States v.
Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 944 (1968); United States v. Sopher, 362 F.2d 523(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966); United
States v. Kubachi, 237 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
Kubachi held that, because a payment to public officials
in return for the improper awarding to an equipment
company of a city contract to buy parking meters did
not involve the fear of economic loss by coercion, bribery
not extortion was committed. The continued validity of
this case in light of Addonizio and Kenney is doubtful.
2
3In United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.
1973), the court held that the fear of economic harm by
a tavern owner, who made monthly payments to the
police, constituted extortion even where the confronta-
tions with the police were friendly and where there was
evidence that the money was turned over voluntarily.
The court framed the voluntariness issue as a jury ques-
tion and concluded that the jury could properly find
extortion. The court did not squarely confront the dis-
tinction, if any, between bribery and extortion, stating:
Because we cannot accept defendant's view of the
facts, it is not necessary for us to reach the question
of whether bribery and extortion are mutually ex-
clusive. Nevertheless, we note that at least one cir-
cuit has held that they are not. See United States v.
Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3606.
In Kahn the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was confronted with a claim by the
defendants that under 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970), where
bribery is charged, proof that the defendants paid
money in response to extortionate acts by public offi-
dais is a complete defense. The court held that under
Pennsylvania law there was no provision for extortion
as a defense to bribery, but it concluded, alongwith the
trial court, that evidence of extortion on the part of the
public officials could be considered by the jury in de-
termining whether the defendants had the requisite
criminal intent under Section 1952. The court also
concluded that "every bribery case involves at least
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Once the issue of extortion has been resolved,
the only remaining hurdle to negotiate is the
statute's requirement that there be an effect on
commerce. However, since courts generally have
interpreted the commerce requirement expan-
sively, there is, as a practical matter, little diffi-
culty satisfying this requirement.4 The only area
some coercion by the public official; the instances of
honest men being corrupted by 'dirty money,' if not
non-existent, are at least exceedingly rare." United
States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1973). Thus,
it may be said that the Kahn court, at least in theory,
would accept the notion that under color of official
right extorton ipso facto eliminates a defenseof bribery,
although the actions of the victim may be used by the
defendant public official to demonstrate that the requi-
site criminal intent for extortion had not been proved.
This approach, however, might run into difficulty if a
court was inclined to rule that bribery is irrelevant
under the Hobbs Act with regard to a public official.
As stated in Kahn, evidence of bribery under Section
1952 would only be relevant on the issues of intent and
willfulness. Id. at 278. In a Hobbs Act extortion case,
however, where a public official is charged with extor-
tion under the color of official right clause, it could be
argued strongly that no willfulness or specific intent is
required. Unlike Section 1952, which requires travel or
the use of interstate facilities with the intent to commit
a crime, the Hobbs Act does not appear to require any
specific mental state. In the end, therefore, analysis of
the decisions under Section 1952 bribery can be of little
aid in determining whether or not bribery is a defense
to a Hobbs Act extortion charge against a public official.
Although, as Judge Sweigert in DeMet made clear,
the court was not deciding whether or not the distinc-
tion between bribery and extortion is irrelevant under
the Hobbs Act, the Seventh Circuit may have the op-
portunity to decide that issue in United States v.
Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (N.D. Ill. 1973), now pending
on appeal. In that case the defendant police officers
were convicted solely on the basis that they received
money under color of official right. In its charge to thejury, the trial court did not require the jury to find
either threats, coercion, or initiation by the victims.24See, e.g., United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816
(7th Cir. 1973) (where a tavern owner made small
monthly payments of money to police and his liquor
was manufactured out of state); United States v.
Augello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1070 (1972) (where meat purchased from New
Jersey for New York drive-in restaurant, and payments
depleted resources with which victim could purchase
out of state goods); United States v. DeMasi, 445 F.2d
251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1167 (1971) (where
meat and alcoholic beverages were purchased outside
the state for use in a club and these deliveries would
stop if the club were closed); Battaglia v. United States,
383 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 907
(1968) (where the owner of a bowling alley was forced to
place the defendant's pool table in his alley, although
the pool table had not been obtained by the defendant
until interstate movement had ended). See also Esperti
v. United States, 406 F.2d 148 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 938 (1969); United States v. Amabile, 395
F.2d 47 (7th Cir.), vacated in part, 394 U.S. 310 (1968);
United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968); United States v. Pro-
venzanno, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 947 (1969); Anderson v. United States, 262
of police corruption that may yet be beyond reach
of the Hobbs Act is what has been described as
purely internal corruption and isolated gratuities.
However, as will be seen later, even those officers
who cannot be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act
may nevertheless find themselves under federal
indictment.
B. Federal Perjury Statutes
The federal perjury statute 5 and the federal
false sworn declaration statute 6 have become
F.2d 764 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 929 (1959);
United States v. Stirone, 168 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa.
1957), a ffd 262 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1958), reversed, 361
U.S. 212 (1959).
All of these cases found the requisite nexus with com-
merce. But see United States v. Crichley, 353 F.2d 358
(3d Cir. 1965). In applying these cases to police corrup-
tion, there is a strong basis to conclude that when a
police officer extorts money from any business whose
products are either delivered from or manufactured in
another state, the requisite effect on commerce is met.
Similarly, it can even be argued that payments to
police by prostitutes, burglars, and other criminals will
affect commerce under the Hobbs Act if some minimal
nexus with another state is proved.
25 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970) provides:
Whoever, having taken an oath before a compe-
tent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in
which a law of the United States authorizes an oath
to be administered, that he will testify, declare,
depose, or certify truly, or that any written testi-
mony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him
subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such
oath states or subscribes any material matter
which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of
perjury, and shall, except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, be fined not more than $2,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This
section is applicable whether the statement or sub-
scription is made within or without the United
States.
26 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970) provides:
(a) Whoever under oath in any proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the
United States knowingly makes any false material
declaration or makes or uses any other information,
including any book, paper, document, record,
recording, or other material, knowing the same to
contain any false material declaration, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.(b) This section is applicable whether the con-
duct occurred within or without the United States.(c) An indictment or information for violation of
this section alleging that, in any proceedings before
or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States, the defendant under oath has knowingly
made two or more declarations, which are incon-
sistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily
false, need not specify which declaration is false if-
(1) each declaration was material to the point
in question, and(2) each declaration was made within the
period of the statute of limitations for the offense
charged under this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of
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powerful weapons for the prosecutor in the in-
vestigation of public corruption. Both statutes
deal with false testimony under oath, and in an
investigation of public corruption are most per-
tinent at the grand jury stage.
When a prosecutor, with the aid of a grand
jury, begins an investigation of police corruption,
he initially has the benefit of only one or two wit-
nesses who have paid money to a police officer.Y
a declaration set forth in the indictment or informa-
tion shall be established sufficient for conviction by
proof that the defendant while under oath made
irreconcilably contradictory declarations ma-
terial to the point in question in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury. It
shall be a defense to an indictment or information
made pursuant to the first sentence of this sub-
section that the defendant at the time he made each
declaration believed the declaration was true.(d) Where, in the same continuous court or
grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is
made, the person making the declaration admits
such declaration to be false, such admission shall
bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the
admission is made, the declaration has not sub-
stantially affected the proceeding, or it has not
become manifest that such falsity has been or will
be exposed.(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this
section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be
necessary that such proof be made by any particu-
lar number of witnesses or by documentary or other
type of evidence.
This statute was enacted as part of the Organized
Crime and Control Act of 1970 and, as can be seen from
paragraph (e), eliminates any evidentiary requirements
that had been by virtue of common law development,
subsumed under the perjury statute. Thus, there is no
evidentiary mandate that proof of a violation must be
supported by two witnesses or by one witness and
corroboration as is the case with Section 1621. Proof of
a false sworn declaration simply requires evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The false declaration statute differs in other ways
from the perjury statute. Proof of two inconsistent
statements by the witness to a degree that one of them
is necessarily false will support conviction (paragraph
(c)). On the other hand, a witness can admit that a
previous statement before the same grand jury was
false and thereby avoid indictment (paragraph (d)).
Naturally, the elimination of the two witness rule has
been of great benefit to prosecutors, but neither that
change nor the cure provision is specifically relevant to
the interesting uses to which either statute may be put
by a prosecutor in an investigation of police corruption
or other local official corruption with which the textual
discussion is concerned.
27This arises because, until the testimony and co-
operation of a police officer or other "inside" witness
is secured, it is practically impossible to fashion a case
which will set forth a conspiracy allowing a single in-
dictment to be returned against a number of police
officers who share in the proceeds of collections which
have, perhaps, been made by only one of these officers.
Without the testimony of this type of witness, indict-
ments must be returned against each officer separately
for his own collections from individual victims because
the victims will be unable, alone, to tie all the officers
The prosecutor often finds that calling the sus-
pected officer to the grand jury to question him
about the alleged extortionate payments will only
result in the officer denying that payments were
made or invoking the privilege against self incrim-
ination. If, at the time of his appearance before
the grand jury, the officer is still on the police
force and a regulation of the police department
authorizes the firing or suspending of an officer
who refuses to testify, the officer will probably
choose to answer all questions and save his job,
hoping that his cooperation will convince the
grand jury not to return an indictment.2s While
the officer has this option, he must know that
there is only the slightest possibility that his testi-
mony will save him from indictment.29 If the
officer testifies and denies receiving any payments,
the prosecutor will add an additional count in the
indictment for perjury or false sworn declara-
tionsY0
together in a single plan to extort money. Thus, A, B,
C and D victims may each be paying $100 per month
to E, F, G and H officers, respectively. With only the
victims as witnesses, separate indictments must be
returned against each officer. However, if E will testify
that he shared his proceeds with F, G and H, who in
turn shared their collections with him, then a single
indictment may be returned against all the police
officers.
28 The constitutionality and legality of a rule which
authorizes discharge of a public employee from office
for asserting his fifth amendment rights is discussed
in notes 40-52 infra and accompanying text.
29 The prosecutor's statement to the grand jury that
the uncorroborated testimony of a businessman that
he paid money to a police officer constitutes probable
cause is enough to convince the grand jury that an
indictment can be returned although no definite con-
clusion is reached on the truthfulness of either witness.
Because there is no requirement that the officer be
called to testify at all, this argument to the grand jury
has great persuasive force, especially where the pros-
ecutor has been able to establish rapport with the jury
members. This analysis has been corroborated by my
experience in working with a grand jury investigating
police corruption in Chicago where oftentimes the
victims never testified before the grand jury at all and
the jury instead heard an FBI agent report of the
victim's statement to him. In no such case was a police
officer's sworn denial to the grand jury so convincing
that an indictment was not voted upon affirmatively.
And in no case did the grand jury insist that the victim
testify in person. Generally, hearsay testimony alone
is sufficient to support the return of an indictment.
United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
30 Where there is only one witness and no corrobora-
tion, the false declaration statute must be used. Even
where more than one witness is available prosecutors
prefer to use the false declaration statute unless the
cure provision presents problems. The validity ofjoining in one indictment against one defendant a count
of perjury or false declarations with a substantive
extortion charge is governed by the provisions of Rule
8(a) of the federal rules. That rule provides:
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An indictment containing both charges of per-
jury or false sworn declarations and extortion
gives the prosecutor several advantages, even when
the factual basis for the different counts of the
indictment is the same. First, there is the increased
possibility in a close case for a compromise ver-
dict-the opportunity for the jury to find the de-
fendant guilty on only some counts. This is especi-
ally important where, without the perjury or false
declaration charge, the indictment would have
only one count. Second, there is the effect, how-
ever minimal, of the indictment indicating to the
(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses
may be charged in the same indictment or informa-
tion in a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged, whether felonies or misde-
meanors or both, are of the same or similar char-
acter or are based on the same act or transaction
or on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme
or plan.
FED. R. Cmer. P. 8(a).
The problem of joinder arises from the fact that the
perjury or false declaration offense is committed sub-
sequent to and separate from the extortion, although
both charges depend on proof of the same elemental
fact-whether or not the police officer took money.
Joinder is further complicated where only one of many
defendants is charged in an indictment with either
perjury or false declaration. This latter joinder problem
ssomewhat alleviated by the presence of a conspiracy
charge or at least a charge that all of the defendants
acted together in the planning and execution of the
substantive criminal act. Where only one defendant
was involved and where he was charged with both
extortion and false declaration, his conviction was
affirmed. See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1406(7th Cir. 1973) (memorandum opinion affirming the
conviction where the trial court had overruled de-
fendant's objections to joinder). Courts have generally
allowed joinder of false statement charges with their
counterpart substantive charges. See United States v.
Roselli, 452 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 401
U.S. 924 (1970) (holding that the joinder of charges
against defendants to cheat for profit in rigged gin
rummy games with charges of false statements relating
to the profits from those games on their income tax
returns was permissible).
In a conspiracy case charging numerous substantive
counts, the joinder of perjury counts was also held
proper in United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.
1974) (Special Panel of Judges from another circuit).
However, the seventh circuit recently reversed a case
for improper joinder of false declarations with extortion
under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, holding that although joinder may be proper
until Rule 8(a) prejudice arises because the defendant
has the burden of overcoming an implicit presumption
that he lied to the grand jury about the crime with
which he is charged. United States v. Pacente, 490
F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1973). The government has petitioned
for a hearing en banw on the grounds that a different
panel of the court had implicitly ruled the other way
in United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir.
1973). The Pacente decision was also criticized in
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1160 (7th Cir.
1974).
jury that at least one tribunal consisting of people
like themselves believed that the defendant was
not a truthful witness. Third, the officer will be
forced to testify at trial. Since the grand jury
testimony will be placed before the jury, the de-
fendant cannot afford to remain silent at trial.
Fourth, even with a charge to the jury which in
effect states that the defendant can be found
guilty of extortion only if the payment was not a
bribe, the jury may still return a verdict on the
perjury or false declaration count, if it believes
that the defendant lied about receiving money
from the victim. In other words, the defendant
may find himself convicted although the evidence
does not support a finding that he violated the
Hobbs Act. Finally, if the defendant is charged
with more than one count of extortion involving
wholly unrelated payments to him by different
individuals, the judge will charge the jury that it
must consider the evidence on each count sep-
arately. However, the jury may consider all the
evidence on the perjury or false declaration count
because the crime alleged is the denial that any
money was received. Thus, the perjury or false
declaration charge allows the~jury to consider the
testimony of all witnesses together, although they
may not do so in connection with the separate
counts of extortion.
An equally important use of the federal false
testimony statutes is the permissibility of indicting
an officer for collecting money more than five years
prior to the date of the indictment. These pay-
ments would be beyond indictment under the
Hobbs Act because of the statute of limitations.
A prosecutor with witnesses who have paid money
to a police officer, for example in 1964, may call
the officer before the grand jury and ask him if he
ever asked for or received any money from any
businessman in the course of his official duties. If
the officer testifies that he did not, he can be prose-
cuted under the perjury or false declaration statute
despite the fact that, had he answered in the affirm-
ative, he could not have been indicted at all.3'
THE INVESTIGATION AND INDICTMENT STAGE
When commencing an investigation of police
corruption or other official corruption that is be-
lieved to be widespread in a community, a planned
procedure of obtaining information and usable
evidence is necessary. One way of proceeding that
is well suited to investigations of organized police
31 An indictment was obtained on this basis in United
States v. Devitt, No. 73 CR 75 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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corruption is first to use informers to obtain the
names of individuals involved (both payors and
payees), then to solicit the cooperation of those
who paid the police, and finally, to select a few
key police officers upon whom concentrated efforts
can be made to elicit testimony against other
officers of the same rank and superiors in the higher
levels of the police department.32 If each step of
this procedure meets with positive results, the end
product will be a conspiracy indictment against
participating officers in a payoff and shakedown
scheme.
In considering the method of proceeding against
widespread corruption, the prosecutor will prob-
ably select one specific area of corruption because
it is more likely to yield dividends quickly. Since
witnesses are obviously needed to make any case,
it is best to focus on the kind of corruption which
involves witnesses who will testify with little or no
compulsion. For example, in the investigation of
police corruption in Chicago, the Justice Depart-
ment decided early that, although informant in-
formation was replete with references to payoffs
to police by gamblers, narcotics peddlers, mem-
bers of organized crime, and professional burglars
and other criminals, the best hope for a meaningful
investigation was to examine payments to police
by persons and businesses licensed by the city to
sell alcoholic beverages. Because the individuals
paying money to police were vulnerable to police
enforcement of the liquor license laws,33 but did
2These key officers will generally be the "bagmen,"
i.e. those who collect the money from the victims and
distribute all or a portion of the proceeds to fellow
officers, lawyers, politicians and higher ranking police
officials.31In Chicago, the police department has the re-
sponsibility of investigating applicants for liquor
licenses and investigating for any violation of the city
liquor license laws. Because it is possible for a liquor
license to be suspended or completely revoked for a
wide variety of minor offenses such as the sale of liquor
to minors, the tavern owner finds himself almost com-
pletely at the mercy of the police. An arrest can lead
to a suspension of the license even if no criminal con-
viction is obtained. And, as a result of police powers,
tavern owners are often subjected to quasi-legal tactics
such as the constant checking of licenses and identifica-
tions of patrons, all of which can effectively reduce the
popularity of a tavern. Finally, because there is such a
large host of trivial regulations with which the tavern
owner must comply, the police can cause the owner
trouble almost at will. Among such violations are selling
liquor on credit, not providing an open view from the
street into the entire tavern, not properly displaying a
liquor license, staying open even a minute after the
allowable closing time, and failing to immediately report
to police any disturbance in the tavern. Because viola-
tion of any one of the above rules can cause trouble for
the tavern owner with the liquor license commission,
not engage in any type of general criminal activity,
it was believed that they would be among the
easiest to convince to testify against the officers
whom they paid money.3 Moreover, the police
who took money from these individuals, especially
if it was accomplished pursuant to an organized
scheme, were often the same officers involved in
corruption with various criminal elements in the
community. Thus, if the investigation as designed
was a success, the federal government would have,
in effect, forced into the open the problems of all
police corruption.
Because the payment of money to the police by
tavern owners results in a service to the owner,
any crime committed by the officer in taking
money may be characterized as "victimless." In
this type of crime, the investigator initially may
encounter some difficulty in obtaining information.
However, where an informant already has stated
that a certain individual has paid the police, the
attitude of "we know you paid" conveyed to the
witness may be enough to obtain his cooperation.
In any event, it is true that at first where the
investigators are simply interviewing every tavern
owner in a particular district, the majority will
deny ever having paid the police or having knowl-
edge of any one who did.15 However, if a few, but
significant number of tavern owners cooperate, a
snowball effect may occur which will encourage
others to come forward with information. 6
At first it may also be difficult to obtain the
cooperation of police officers, particularly those
who have taken money. For this reason, the em-
ployment of some type of legal compulsion is usu-
ally necessary. Although the police officer who is
destined to become an accomplice witness may
he is usually more than happy to pay money or grant
special discounts to the police to avoid any possibility
of trouble or harrassment.
14 This is not to say that tavern owners flock to testify
about their payments to police, but it is true that,
because they have relatively little to hide other than
the payment of money itself, traditional methods of
investigative pressure judicially applied by the agent
will achieve the desired results. Although this article
focuses on the payment of money to police by in-
dividuals who have liquor licenses, its precepts apply
to anyone paying money to a public official who does
not want the official to countenance or overlook serious
and continuous criminal conduct but simply desires
freedom from compliance with certain regulations.
2 In many police districts in Chicago and other large
cities, a tavern owner who maintains that he does not
even know of anyone who has paid the police can be
assumed to be lying or at best incredibly naive.
-1 For those who do not cooperate at the interview




never be taken before the grand jury or given
immunity, the threat of employing these devices
may by necessary to force the officer to cooperate.p
Similarly, in attempting to obtain testimony from
lawyers who may have played a significant role in
a coiruption scheme (for example, in passing
money to the police in order to expedite the ap-
proval of liquor licenses), legal compulsion or
threat of its use may also be required.
It is clear therefore that although much valuable
spade work can be done through investigation
alone, more formal means of building a case are
necessary. Federal prosecutors have been particu-
larly adept at using the grand jury subpoena,
immunity and local administrative regulations to
elicit testimony and cooperation in an investi-
gation.
One method used by federal prosecutors is to
subpoena a police officer before the grand jury
even though sufficient evidence for an indictment
already has been uncovered. When a potential
defendant is subpoenaed in the usual federal crim-
inal investigation, the witness may either testify
or assert his fifth amendment privilege against
self incrimination.n However, in a jurisdiction
where a local police rule or state law authorizes
dismissal of an officer for refusing to testify before
any investigative body which is seeking informa-
17 More than any other professional group in society,
the police have a code of secrecy. A breach of this code
brings on the officer more approbation than the worst
compromise of his integrity in the performance of his
duties. Some police officers have suffered indictment,
conviction, and stiff prison sentences for as little as
taking a few dollars from one tavern owner (in one
case simply asking for money and never receiving it),
knowing that cooperation would have enabled them to
avoid jail altogether and possibly even indictment.
But the code of secrecy is often so strong that nothing
will make an officer talk about his colleagues' illegal
activities. Eventually, however, the code can be broken,
but it is a long process and requires constant concen-
trated effort by the investigators and prosecutors.
38 Although the law is far from clear, it has been the
general practice in federal grand jury proceedings to
inform a witness, who may be subsequently indicted,
that he is a potential defendant and to inform him of
his constitutional rights as a police officer would under
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Thus, the
warnings given would consist of the following:(1) You are a potential defendant in the investiga-
tion.(2) You have a right to remain silent. Anything
you say may be used against you in a later court
proceeding.(3) You may have an attorney to advise you. Al-
though he may not come into the grand jury
room, you may leave to consult with him prior
to answering a question.(4) If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you prior to any questioning.
tion about his official duties, severe consequences
attend the exercise of an option not to testify. 9
Naturally, the questions which face federal and
local officials under these circumstances is whether
such firings and suspensions are constitutionally
permissible and what appropriate means are avail-
able for local authorities to learn if a police officer
did in fact refuse to answer questions during the
supposedly secret grand jury proceeding.
The United States Supreme Court has discussed
the question of whether a public official may be
discharged for refusing to testify in a criminal
investigation, but has yet to resolve several critical
issues. In Garrity v. New Jersey10 police officers in
New Jersey were brought before an administrative
tribunal supervised by the State Attorney General
and asked questions about the fixing of traffic
tickets. Each officer was warned that anything he
might say could be used against him and that if
he refused to testify he would be subject to re-
moval from office under a New Jersey statute. The
officers all testified and some of the answers were
used against them in a subsequent criminal prose-
cution. In a five to four decision, the United States
Supreme Court reversed their convictions and held
that "protection of the individual under the Four-
teenth Amendment against coerced confessions
prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of
confessions obtained under threat of removal from
office, and that it extends to all, whether they are
policemen or other members of our body politic." a
In Spevak v. Klein,42 the Supreme Court held that
a lawyer could not be disbarred for asserting the
privilege against self-incrimination. Neither of
these cases decided whether a police officer may be
discharged from employment because he refuses to
testify. Spevak did not deal with a public official,
and in a footnote Justice Douglas stated that
"whether a policeman who invokes the privilege
where his conduct as a police officer is questioned
in disciplinary proceedings, may be discharged for
refusing to testify is a question we do not reach." 13
Thus, despite the apparently broad sweep of Spetvak
and Garrity and Justice Douglas' insistence that
"we find no room in the privilege against self-in-
19 For example, in Chicago, eight of the first nine
police officers who were called before the grand jury
were suspended by the police department for asserting
their fifth amendment rights. Through the ensuing
months it became rare for an officer to "take the fifth."
40 385 U.S. 493 (1967).41 Id. at 500.
42 385 U.S. 511 (1967).43 Id. at 516, n.3.
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crimination for classification of people so as to
deny it to some and extend it to others," 44 neither
case reached the question of the discharge of public
employees.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have done
little to clarify the problem. In Gardner v. Brod-
erick,41 a New York City policeman was sub-
poenaed before a grand jury where he was advised
of his constitutional rights and asked to sign a
waiver of immunity. The constitution of New York
and the Charter of New York City required a
waiver of immunity if the public official wished to
retain his position. The officer refused to sign the
waiver of immunity and was discharged. Citing
Spevak and Garrity, the Supreme Court held that
the officer could not be discharged for refusing to
waive his immunity. But the Court stopped short
of holding that an officer could not be fired for
refusing to answer questions about his official
duties:
He was discharged from office, not for failure to
answer relevant questions about his official duties,
but for refusal to waive a constitutional right. He
was dismissed for failure to relinquish the protec-
tions of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The constitution of New York State and the City
Charter both expressly provided that his failure
to do so, as well as his failure to testify, would re-
sult in dismissal from his job. He was dismissed
solely for his refusal to waive the immunity to
which he is entitled if he is required to testify de-
spite his constitutional privilege. 4'
In other words, the Court simply held that, inas-
much as Garrity would prevent the use of any
compelled testimony against the officer, an at-
tempt by the state to force the officer to sign a
document waiving that protection was improper.
The Court did not hold that the officer can escape
discharge for asserting the privilege against self-
incrimination. -
44 Id. at 516.
4 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
6 Id. at 278.
47 justice Harlan concurred in the result although he
had vigorously dissented in Garrity and Spevak. But,
because he read the Court's opinion in Gardner as
leaving the way open for the discharge of an officer
refusing to testify, he considered it necessary in view
of the decisions in Garrity and Spevak to concur. Thus,
he said:
I do so [concur] with a good deal less reluctance than
would otherwise have been the case because, despite
the distinctions which are sought to be drawn be-
tween these two cases, on the one hand and Spevak
In Lefkowitz v. Turley,5 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a New York
statute which provided that if a public contractor
refused to waive immunity or to testify concern-
ing his state contracts, his existing contracts could
be cancelled and he would be disqualified from
doing business with the state for five years. In
Lefkowitz several such contractors were disqualified
for refusing to waive immunity. In holding the
statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court car-
ried forward its approach in Gardner and stated
that "... given adequate immunity, the state may
plainly insist that employees either answer ques-
tions under oath about the performance of their
job or suffer the loss of employment." 4 9 The Court
held the same standard applied to public contrac-
tors and that adequate immunity would consist of
a prohibition of the use of the compelled testimony
or its fruits.
Since there is no authoritative holding by the
Supreme Court on exactly when and how public
officials may be discharged for refusing to answer
questions concerning their official duties, the lower
courts have reacted in varying ways when con-
fronted with the constitutionality of local police
and Garrity, on the other, I find in these opinions a
procedural formula whereby, for example, public
officials may now be discharged and lawyers dis-
ciplined for refusing to divulge to appropriate
authority information pertinent to the faithful
performance of their offices. I add only that this is a
welcome breakthrough in what Spevak and Garrity
might otherwise have been thought to portent.
Id. at 285.
That the Supreme Court was not deciding the right to
discharge a public employee for refusing to testify
was clearly stated in Gardner's companion case,. Uni-
formed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner,
392 U.S. 280 (1968). justice Fortas, speaking for the
Court, stated:[If] New York had demanded that petitioners answer
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating
to the performance of their official duties on pain of
dismissal from public employment without requiring
relinquishment of the benefits of the constitutional
privilege, and if they had refused to do so, this case
would be entirely different.
Id. at 284.
After the decision in Uniformed, the Second Circuit
again had occasion to deal with the issue after further
disciplinary proceedings by the City of New York had
occurred. Uniformed Sanitation Men Association, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970). The
court held that "use immunity" suffices for the dis-
charge of public employees for refusing to testify and
noted that discharge may occur so long as the questions
propounded relate to the performance of his duties and
the official is advised of his options and the consequences
of his choice.
48 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
19 Id. at 84.
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rules.W0 For example, in Confederation of Police v.
Conlisk5t the Seventh Circuit held that several
officers who had appeared before a federal grand
jury and subsequently refused to tell the investi-
gative division of the police department whether
they had answered the questions propounded to
them by the federal prosecutor could not be dis-
charged. The court denied the right to discharge
on the narrow ground that the officers were not
being questioned by their superiors about their
official duties, although the city was attempting to
find out if they had refused to testify about their
duties before the grand jury. The effect of this
decision was to reinstate the officers although under
an extension of the language in the United States
Supreme Court cases they could have been dis-
charged had they been asked by the police investi-
gators the same questions about their duties that
the federal prosecutor had asked them and then
again refused to answer. The court also concluded
that it was improper to fire the officers for simply
invoking the fifth amendment, ignoring the fact
that it was the questions which were asked the
officers in the federal grand jury that resulted in
their discharge, not simply their invoking the fifth
amendment. Because the police department could
have discovered what had been asked at the fed-
eral grand jury proceeding in any case,52 the ques-
tions concerning whether the officers had invoked
the fifth amendment were unnecessary. In any
event, the court of appeals apparently misread the
60 See, e.g., Kalidnes v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391
(Ct. Cl. 1973) and Confederation of Police v. Conlisk,
489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), where both courts held
that the discharge of an official for refusing to answer
questions was improper because he was not informed
that he was subject to discharge if he asserted his fifth
amendment rights or that, if he answered the ques-
tions, his testimony could not be used against him.
The logic of a requirement that a witness be told
that his testimony cannot be used against him ap-
parently grew out of the infirm waiver of immunity
requirement condemned in Gardner and Uniformed
(and again recently condemned in Tvrley). Still, the
rationale behind the requirement is suspect. Whatever
the witness is advised, his testimony cannot be used
against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding, but
there does not seem at present any prohbition against
using that testimony to effect his discharge from public
office. In any event, the requirement of telling a witness
public employee that he has "use immunity" if he
testifies has not spread to other courts. Such a require-
ment, if given full effect, would immeasurably compli-
cate the proceedings and would add little in the way of
protection for the witness because, whether or not he
is told, the compelled testimony cannot be used against
him under Garrity.
51 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973).
6 See note 58 infra.
implications of Garrity and subsequent cases by
placing undue emphasis on the inquiry by the
local officials after the officers had already refused
to testify before the federal grand jury.0
51 However, many other courts have held that a
public official may be discharged for refusing to answer
questions and take a lie detector test concerning the
conduct of his official duties. Although courts recognized
that the statements extracted from the officer during
the lie detector test cannot be used against him in any
subsequent criminal proceeding, courts have generally
been able to find their way through the gaps left by
Spevak, Garrity, Gardner, Uniformed Sanitation and
Turley to the conclusion that no constitutional impedi-
ments arise which would prevent discharge of the
police officer. See, e. g., Fischera v. State Personnel
Board, 217 Cal. App. 2d 613, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1963);
Coursey v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners,
90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 254 N.E.2d 339 (1967); Dieck v.
Department of Police, 266 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 1972);
Clayton v. New Orleans Police Department, 236 So. 2d
548 (La.App. 1970); Roux v. New Orleans Police
Department, 223 So. 2d 905 (La. Ct. App.), aft'd, 254
La. 815, 227 So. 2d 148, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008
(1969); Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle,
80 Wash.2d 307, 494 P.2d 485 (1972). Bat see Molino
v. Board of Public Safety, 154 Conn. 368, 225 A.2d
805 (1966). Devito v. Civil Service Commission, 404
Pa. 354 172 A.2d 161 (1961).
In addition the majority view among state courts
which have considered the question of discharge of a
public official for refusal to testify in a grand jury or
other proceeding is that discharge is constitutionally
permissible. For example, in Seattle Police Officers'
Guild v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash.2d 307, 494 P.2d
485 (1972), the police chief of Seattle had initiated an
internal investigation which resulted in the ordering of
various officers to respond to questions concerning their
official conduct or suffer dismissal. This internal in-
vestigation was in response to evidence that several
police officers had been involved in the taking of pay-
offs. No officer was compelled to waive immunity and
all of the questions asked concerned only the officers'
performance of their duties. The Police Officers' Guild
sought to enjoin the investigation and the trial court
granted the injunction. On appeal the Washington
Supreme Court reversed, holding that no iniunction
could be granted which would prevent the police chief
and the city of Seattle from dismissing or otherwise
disciplining an officer for asserting his fifth amendment
rights to questions directed at the performance of his
official duties. See also Clifford v. Shoultz, 413 F.2d 868
(9th Cir. 1969); Bowes v. Commission, 330 F. Supp.
262 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Kammerer v. Board of Fire and
Police Commissioners of the Village of Lombard, 44
Ill. 2d 500, 256 N.E.2d 12 (1970); Silverio v. Municipal
Court, 355 Mass. 623, 247 N.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 396
U.S. 878 (1969); State v. Falco, 60 N.J. 570, 292 A.2d
13 (1972). Finally, if an officer testifies falsely, he may
be prosecuted for perjury, although the testimony may
have been unconstitutionally compelled. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2514 (1970); see also Glickstein v. United States,
222 U.S. 139 (1911); United States v. Winter, 348
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965); Kronick v. United States, 343
F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Parker, 244
F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1957); United States v. Provenzano,
326 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1971); United States v.
Kelly, 254 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States
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While many of the issues remain unsettled, it
does appear that a carefully worded warning to
public officials followed by questions relating to
their official duties can be the basis for a subse-
quent discharge if the officials refuse to answer
the questions. As long as the official can be dis-
charged for refusing to answer, the prosecutor has
significant leverage over the official.
In light of the significance of what may occur
at the federal grand jury proceeding, some mech-
anism had to be devised to allow disclosure of the
officer's action before the grand jury, particularly
to those local officials who have the power to effect
the discharges. While federal grand jury proceed-
ings generally remain secret, Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically
provides that disclosure will be allowed "prelim-
inary to or in connection with a judicial proceed-
ing."" The use of this rule to uncover what oc-
curred at the grand jury proceedings can be illus-
trated in the following way. In an investigation,
subpeonas which are issued by the grand jury can
be delivered to the police department, which will
normally issue an order requiring the designated
officers to appear before the grand jury. 5 This
ex rel. Rohrlich v. Wallach, 251 F. Supp. 1009, 1011
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Robinson v. United States,
401 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1968). But see Goldberg v.
United States, 472 F.2d 513, 516 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973).
4The rule provides:
(e) Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure. Dis-
closure of matters occurring before the grand jury
other than its deliberations and the vote of anyjuror may be made to the attorneys for the govern-
ment for use in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenog-
rapher, operator of a recording device, or any typist
who transcribes recorded testimony may dis-
close matters occurring before the grand jury
only when so directed by the court preliminarily
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or
when permitted by the court at the request of the
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist
for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury. No
obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any
person except in accordance with this rule. The
court may direct that an indictment shall be kept
secret until the defendant is in custody or has
given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal
the indictment and no person shall disclose the
finding of the indictment except when necessary
for the issuance and execution of a warrant or
summons.
FED. R. CRaM. P. 6(e).
" Although this technically means a subpoena is not
properly served on the police officer until his appearance
before the grand jury (thus removing the possibility
for court sanctions for non-appearance), it avoids the
necessity of serving subpoenas on officers whose home
addresses are unknown and who, while on duty, are
difficult to locate quickly.
information will also be turned over to the city's
corporation counsel. After each appearance before
the grand jury, the corporation counsel can inter-
view the officers and ask them if they answered all
the questions propounded by the grand jury
through the federal prosecutor. Once this is ac-
complished, the corporate counsel can then file a
motion with the federal district court seeking dis-
closure of whether the officer had in fact answered
all the questions. At the hearing on the motion to
disclose pursuant to court order, the government
will read into the record any questions which the
officer had refused to answer. 56 If the officer had
refused to provide answers, the police department
will then draw charges against the officer for failure
to cooperate with the grand jury." In designing
this procedure, advantage is taken of the fact
that once it becomes known to local officials that
an officer had refused to answer questions before
the grand jury, there could be a subsequent ad-
ministrative hearing and a later appeal to the
courts by the officer, which would satisfy the "pre-
liminary to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding" requirement under the federal rule.
Numerous cases support the disclosure of grand
jury testimony in this way. For example, in In re
Grand Jury Transcripts,"s the Chief of Police of
Columbus, Ohio applied for an order releasing a
transcript of a federal grand jury proceeding for
use in an administrative hearing in connection with
56 The government needed an order entered by the
Chief judge to protect it against any possible charge
that it was conniving with the local authorities to oust
police officers from their jobs and to subvert grandjury secrecy.
In Chicago the question of disclosure first arose in
open court. The first group of officers to be subpoenaed
were all represented by the same attorney who, upon
the completion of their appearances promptly filed a
suit in federal court to enjoin the police department
from taking any action against the officers for refusing
to answer questions. The federal government was not
a party to this action but under court order read into
the record in a public proceeding the questions the
officers had refused to answer. The court then dismissed
the suit by the officers holding that an officer could be
fired for refusing to answer questions relating to his
official duties. But see Confederation of Police v.
Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973).
7See Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d
891 (7th Cir. 1973). The charge would have to be for
the officer's failure to answer questions about his official
duties in the grand jury not for failure to answer the
inquiry by the corporation counsel. See notes 40-52
sup a.
"3 309 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ohio 1970). See also Doe
v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958); In re
Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1952). But see




disciplinary charges against various police officers.
The court held that the federal rule was met be-
cause the administrative hearing might result in
the suspension of the officer which would then be
subject to appeal.
In the event that an officer takes the risk of
being fired and invokes the fifth amendment at
the grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor can
compel testimony through the use of immunity in
order to uncover certain evidence vital to the in-
vestigation and prosecution of the case.59 Under
19The statutory provisions regarding transactional
immunity are found in 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970) and
state that, once given such immunity, a witness can-
not be prosecuted for any offense about which he
testified:
Whenever in the judgment of a United States
attorney the testimony of any witness, or the pro-
duction of books, papers, or other evidence by any
witness, in any case or proceeding before any grandjury or court of the United States involving any
violation of this chapter or any of the offenses
enumerated in section 2516, or any conspiracy
to violate this chapter or any of the offenses enu-
merated in section 2516 is necessary to the public
interest, such United States attorney, upon the
approval of the Attorney General, shall make ap-
plication to the court that the witness shall be
instructed to testify or produce evidence subject
to the provisions of this section, and upon order
of the court such witness shall not be excused from
testifying or from producing books, papers, or
other evidence on the ground that the testimony
or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate
him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. No
such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he
is compelled, after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used
as evidence in any criminal proceeding (except in
a proceeding described in the next sentence) against
him in any court. No witness shall be exempt
under this section from prosecution for perjury or
contempt committed while giving testimony or
producing evidence under compulsion as provided
in this section.
The statutory provisions regarding use immunity are
found in 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). Use immunity differs
from transactional immunity in that an immunized
federal witness may still be prosecuted if his testimony
or any of its fruits are not used against him. Thus,
Section 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refused, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or
provide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee
of the two Houses, or a committee oz a subcom-
mittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding com-
municates to the witness an order issued under
this part, the witness may not refuse to comply
with the order on the basis of his privilege against
federal law, the government has the power to grant
use or transactional immunity in support of its
investigation of local corruption. According to
several United States Supreme Court cases, the
decision by federal prosecutors to give certain
witnesses immunity may have significant effects
on the ability of state or local officials to prosecute
the offenders under their own laws. In Murphy v.
Waterfront Commissin 60 the Court held that evi-
dence or its fruits elicited by state or federal offi-
cials under a grant of immunity could not be used
by either government in any subsequent prosecu-
tion." As a result, when federal officials decide to
grant use or transactional immunity to tavern
owners or policemen during the course of their
prosecutions, they may be effectively eliminating
any effort by state or local officials to discipline
those given immunity. The problem becomes less
serious when there is cooperation between state
and federal officials, or when local officials refuse
to investigate or prosecute their own officials. Thus,
unless the federal investigation is carried forward
with the purpose of maximizing the benefits in the
self-incrimination; but no testimony or other in-
formation compelled under the order (or any in-
formation directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.60 378 U.S. 52 (1964).6
' See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1971); Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Com-
mission, 406 U.S. 472 (1971).
The Justice Department has instructed its attorneys
in a policy statement not to issue transactional im-
munity. This policy was put into effect because the
Justice Department, in recommending to Congress the
passage of the use immunity statute, had represented
that one of the benefits of use immunity would be the
easing of friction between federal and state law en-
forcement agencies, since use immunity would still
allow the state to prosecute the witness. This, the
Department argued, was important because state law
enforcement officials often resented the subversion of
their investigations by the granting of transactional
immunity by the federal government which precluded
any prosecution, federal or state.
In addition, the justice Department has a policy
which precludes, except in unusual cases, the prosecu-
tion of a witness who has been given use immunity.
This policy was put into effect because of the Depart-
ment's fear that it would be criticized for indicting a
witness given use immunity. The net effect is that a
witness given use immunity need not fear federal
prosecution. There are, however, exceptions. See
United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973)(where an officer who had been previously indicted and
convicted was granted use immunity, was subsequently
unresponsive in his grand jury testimony, and was
indicted again). See also United States v. Holder, No.
73 CR 634 (N.D.I11. 1973). In both of these cases the
defendants ultimately entered guilty pleas.
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particular community effected by local corruption,
the granting of immunity may serve the purpose
of singling out a key official in the police depart-
ment at the expense of allowing other officers to
escape any type of criminal prosecution.
In any event, in police corruption cases individ-
uals who are in the lower echelons of the depart-
ment or who may be the victims of the corruption
may be immunized to obtain evidence against
higher ranking members. This procedure can serve
as an effective way to build a case beyond the
testimony of the victim, who may only have evi-
dence against the officer who collected the money.
Although immunity can be an effective tool, the
prosecutor may prefer to use an accomplice wit-
ness who has already pleaded guilty because an
immunized witness may suffer from tarnished
credibility at trial. For the same reason, testifying
victims are usually not granted immunity.12 If the
victim refuses to provide any information initially,
the threat of immunity may enable the prosecutor
to obtain cooperation from a witness prior to any
grand jury proceeding 3
To aid federal prosecutors in conducting investi-
gations of organized crime, Congress has also
authorized the empaneling of a special grand jury
for an initial term of eighteen months with exten-
sion possibilities for another eighteen months.0
Before the enactment of this statute, a prosecutor
who wished to have an extended investigation by
a grand jury was compelled to select one of the
thirty day juries and extend its term specially.
Although this could easily be accomplished, grand
12 Even if granted use immunity the witness could
still be subjected to state prosecution. The one impedi-
ment to state prosecution is the appearance of such a
prosecution as being an attempt to subvert the federal
investigation. As a result, in the federal investigation
of police corruption in Chicago, no tavern owner has
been prosecuted by the state for bribery.
0 The fact that a police officer may be discharged
for refusing to testify reduces the instances in which
immunity can be employed. Because a witness must
first refuse to answer questions before he can be given
immunity, the witness who testifies fully to avoid being
discharged cannot receive immunity. Thus, in an in-
vestigation of an organized scheme of payments the
officers who may escape indictment and become govern-
ment accomplice witnesses are those who preferred to
be discharged rather than indicted and asserted their
fifth amendment rights when they appeared before the
grand jury. See United States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR
979 (N.D.IUl. 1973) (where several government wit-
nesses were in this category and where many of the de-
fendants may possibly have avoided indictment if they
had refused to testify and negotiated with the prosecu-
tion for immunity).
18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1970), enacted as part of the
Organized Crime and Control Act of 1970.
jurors who had originally assumed that they would
only be required to serve for one month would be
very upset at the increased length of service,
thereby pressuring the prosecutor to bring the
investigation to an end. In addition to the in-
creased length of term of the special grand jury,
several other benefits inure to the prosecutor in-
vestigating public corruption. First, if a witness
refuses to testify pursuant to a grant of immunity,
he may be held in contempt and incarcerated"
either until he agrees to testify or until the term
of the grand jury expires, whichever is shorter."
This may place greater burdens on the witness
who refuses to testify, and force him to review
carefully his decision. Second, the prosecutor can
establish rapport with the grand jurors who know
that they will be sitting for a substantial period of
time. This will give the grand jurors a feeling of
identification with the purposes of the investiga-
tion. Third, the special grand jury may convey an
aura of importance to a witness appearing before
it, especially where the witness is unsophisticated
and has not retained counsel.6 Finally, the special
grand jury presents the possibility that a report
can be written relating in detail the information
gathered by the grand jury which an indictment
and trial could not disclose."
TnE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
The role of the federal prosecutor in an investi-
gation of official corruption differs in both degree
and kind from that which he plays in a case in-
volving the more traditional types of violations of
the federal criminal code. For example, where a
bank robbery has occurred, the assistant United
States Attorney in charge of the case need do little
else than wait for an investigative agent to present
a case report to him. He can then file a complaint
The witness will go to county jail when there are
no adequate federal lock-up failities to house the witness
for an extended period of time. Id.
66 Id.
67 If a witness testifies before the grand jury, the
prosecution at trial will be compelled to disclose to the
defendants his testimony before the grand jury prior
to any cross examination. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
Obviously, the chances that the defense will be able to
impeach the witness on the basis of prior inconsistent
statements are increased. Thus, prosecutors try to avoid
having a cooperative witness testify before a grand
jury if at all possible.
18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970). Because of possible con-
stitutional problems with naming unindicted in-
dividuals in a report, and the possibility of the prosecu-
tion being attacked for using the grand jury as a weapon
of libel and character assassination, prosecutors have
not used this provision.
[Vol. 65
POLICE CORRUPTION
or place the agent before the grand jury to sum-
marize the evidence which will secure the indict-
ment. On the other hand, the prosecutor who is
charged with overseeing an extensive investigation
of local corruption in a particular area must
actively participate in all phases of the investiga-
tion. He must guide the operations of the investi-
gative agents on almost a daily basis.69 He must
decide when to bring any evidence before a grand
jury and in what way that evidence should be
presented.70 He must make judgments concerning
the immunity of witnesses, the scope and extent
of the investigation, and finally whether he too
should act as an investigator. Because of the scope
of his activities, the federal prosecutor, even one
with little experience, possesses wide powers which
can affect the narrow outcome of the investiga-
69 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has tradi-
tionally operated as an intelligence gathering organiza-
tion and a coordinator of various local police depart-
ments where crimes are of a multi-jurisdictional nature.
However, as Congress has increased the scope of the
federal criminal code, so too have the duties and powers
of the FBI grown. Even with this development, the
FBI trains its agents and feels most comfortable with
investigations that require the solution of crimes by
the correlation of evidence gathered by local law en-
forcement officials, or by the analysis of physical and
objective evidence. In an investigation which requires
a significant expenditure of man power over a long
period of time with the same agents involved to assure
continuity and the unearthing of evidence of events
four or five years in the past which can only be re-
constructed through the hazy recollections of reluctant
witnesses and for which informants can provide little
help, the FBI often finds itself in a difficult position.
And, if such an investigation is attended by political
controversy, the FBI has been known to put up a solid
wall of resistance to participating in the investigation
in any meaningful way. See generally Navasky, Kmq-
NErY Jusrics (1971). An investigation of police cor-
ruption involves all of the above difficulties and thus
requires an aggressive prosecutor who is willing to
forfeit much of his activity as a lawyer in favor of
being a politician and a supervisory investigator.
70 Often a grand jury will not be convened or evi-
dence or testimony presented until a solid factual base
is laid and the community is aware that an investiga-
tion is being seriously conducted. In the case of the
investigation of police corruption which is manifested
by the collection of money from businessmen, the
technique of conducting a large number of interviews
on the street both avoids undue expenditure of grandjury time and alerts the community in a very direct
way to the intensity of federal pressure. A prosecutor's
decision to conduct such an investigation by using the
grand jury as a forum for interrogation can lead to
counterproductive results, such as (1) too much
publicity before any substantial amount of evidence is
obtained and (2) the obtaining of lawyers by witnesses
which will often increase the incidence of asserting the
fifth amendment and reduce the possibility of the in-
vestigative agents subtly applying pressure in in-
formal interrogation.
tion, alter the relationship between federal and
local officials, and materially affect public opinion.
In the investigation of police corruption, often
it is difficult to motivate the investigative agency
to commit itself wholeheartedly to the pursuit of
fellow law enforcement officers. This problem may
be especially acute when the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is involved. Because the FBI has
generally concentrated on coordinating the activ-
ities of various local law enforcement agencies and
because the FBI, in many instances, relies on in-
formation and evidence developed by local officials,
fairly close and cordial ties between agents and
police develop2' Agents who are assigned the duty
of conducting an intensive investigation of the
police may find the job distasteful, and must be
willing to suffer a considerable amount of dis-
approval from fellow agents. In a long and drawn
out investigation with unpredictable results, this
situation can lead to a loss of morale and a certain
degree of apathy in the carrying out of the agent's
duties. Occasionally, overt resistance surfacesY2
To avoid these difficulties a careful selection of
agents to participate in the investigation of police
corruption is necessary. However, because of the
FBI's bureaucratic reluctance to be controlled by
the Justice Department, the actual selection of
these agents is often beyond the control of the
prosecutor. The agent, expected to be responsive
to two masters, is himself unsure whether he
should be loyal to his own superiors or to the
prosecutor who may see the proper method of
conducting the investigation differentlyY
71 This developing relationship that can occur is one
of the reasons that agents are often assigned to duty
in cities where they have no familial or friendly ties.
See note 69 supra.
7,In one case reported to this author, an FBI agent
who investigated a civil rights complaint that resulted
in an indictment of a police officer refused to sit at the
prosecutor's table during the trial for fear that he would
be criticized by his fellow agents and suffer the enmity
of other police officers with whom he had developed
cordial relationships.
73 The FBI requires that a report of the interview
be prepared each time an agent speaks to a witness.
Because all of these reports are producible at trial for
use by the defense under the Jenks Act (18 U.S.C. §
3500 (1970)), the prosecutor prefers that the FBI agent
conduct as many interviews as necessary to obtain all
of the witness' recollections but to reduce all of the
sessions to only one written report. The existence of
numerous reports increases the chances for impeach-
ment of the witness by raising the possibility that there
will be inconsistencies between the reports and the
testimony. In order to have one report prepared for
each witness, the prosecutor is forced to solicit the
active cooperation of the agent involved in violating
1974]
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The prosecutor who needs agents who can de-
vote full time and energy to a long investigation
encounters difficulty because of the workload of
agents. Finally, a prosecutor, who requests a large
number of agents to work on an investigation that
might not produce an indictment for a year or
more, often meets with stiff resistance by those in
charge of the investigative agency. 4
CONFLICTS wiTH LOCAL AUTHORITIES
The investigation by the federal government of
police corruption often has as a by-product veiled,
even open, hostility between various governmental
agencies. In more general terms, the federal in-
vestigation and prosecution of crimes which are in
violation of both federal and state laws can easily
lead to resentment by local officials of the intrusion
of the federal government into what they conceive
as their private and exclusive domain. Whatever
the reasons for such resentment,75 the conflict
generated can have far reaching consequences for
the investigation.
Because any investigation of police corruption
usually involves the testimony of one who has
paid money to police, that individual is often tech-
nically susceptible to prosecution under state
bribery laws. Of course, where it is clear that the
police forced the payment by an explicit threat, it
is highly unlikely that any action would or could
be taken against the victim. But in the area of the
expanding coverage of the Hobbs Act, where a
police officer may be prosecuted for receiving
money that closely approaches a bribe under
traditional views, the victim is more vulnerable.
This situation is exacerbated if the victim is a
the FBI regulation. Most agents do not want to run
this risk.7 4In a single three month period of the investigation
in Chicago during 1972, this author had eight meetings
of an hour or more to discuss manpower requirements
for the investigation, wrote three detailed memoranda
to the justice Department in Washington explaining
the problems of dealing with the FBI, and conducted
initial interviews of witnesses that could have been
easily accomplished by agents had they been made
available. It was not unusual to wait from six to eight
weeks for a report after the formal interview of a witness
had occurred.
71 The reasons may include (1) fear of the local
officialdom that their misdeeds may be discovered and
become the subject of investigation and prosecution,
(2) fear that however clean their hands may be, their
power and position may be damaged, (3) concern that
the federal government will go still further and look
into every phase of state and city government, and (4)
a feeling of nonparticipation in an interesting and
challenging effort for which they will get no credit.
businessman licensed by the state or city to sell
alcoholic beverages. Because one's license can in
many jurisdictions be suspended or revoked with-
out conviction for a crime, the witness cannot be
fully protected from state action, even if he is
granted immunity." Of course, the fact that any
action against the witness by local officials could
well be considered purely retributive and obstruc-
tionist may deter harassment of those holding
liquor licenses.
Conflict between the federal and local investi-
gative officials can also arise during the time when
information is collected. In the interviewing of
witnesses, the victim who has paid an officer only
once may not be able to provide the officer's name.
A material aid in identifying the suspected officer
is the availability of photographs, police incident
reports, assignment sheets, and supervisors' logs.
Although this information could possibly be ob-
tained by subpoena, it is obviously more efficient
and desirable if those responsible for keeping these
documents and records agree to make this informa-
tion accessible to the investigators, as needed, on
an "ask for" basis27 Although none of these
points of conflict can entirely stop the progress of
a well coordinated federal investigation, severe
delays can result, and witnesses may be discour-
aged from testifying.
THE TRIAL OF A POLICE CORRUPTION CASE
The prosecution of a police corruption case
generally assumes one of two forms. The simplest
prosecution is against one police officer for extort-
ing money from one or more persons where only
the victim's testimony implicates the defendant. 78
The more sophisticated case involves as witnesses
not only those who paid the police but also one or
more police accomplices who are willing to testify
76 See notes 60-62 supra.
7 In the investigation of police corruption in Chicago,
this arrangement was made with the Chicago Police
Department, although the federal investigation was
sometimes compromised by leaks from the police de-
partment. In one instance an officer was called before
a grand jury to be questioned about a single incident
that had occurred three years earlier and a report of
that incident had been requested from the police de-
partment. When the officer testified before the grandjury, he was well prepared and it was apparent that he
knew that the particular incident in question was going
to be the focus of the interrogation. The origin of the
leak was never learned.
7 Different individuals who pay the same officer




against fellow officers.79 In the first situation, the
strength of the prosecution rests on the credibility
of the victim. There is no physical evidence, and
there are often weaknesses in the identification of
the officer involved. Yet, even where there is only
one victim who can testify that he gave money to
the defendant, the chances for conviction are good.
The reason for this lies in the inherent credibility
of a witness who has no motive to unjustly accuse
the defendant. For example, a tavern owner may
testify that an officer apprehended him for sale of
liquor to a minor and then demanded money in
exchange for not proceeding with the arrest."' No
police report was written by the officer and thus
no record exists that any part of the incident oc-
curred. The officer is free to deny ever being at the
tavem and then hope that, if accused, the identifi-
cation testimony of the victim will be weak. More-
over, the tavern owner has been previously cited
on numerous occasions for violations of the liquor
license laws. The defendant, on the other hand,
has a good record and appears comfortable and
self-assured on the stand." But the prosecution has
an unassailable advantage-the victim has no
reason to lie. 2 The defense counsel cannot main-
tain that the tavern owner has a reason for falsely
implicating the officer since he was not arrested by
him, nor can the defendant avoid the impact of
the tavern owner's explanation that he was afraid
he would lose his license and his business if he did
not accede to the officer's demand for money.
Part of the prosecution's appeal in a case like the
one described above is its disarming simplicity, in-
volving as it does the payment of money to a po-
lice officer by a person at the mercy of police
power. The prosecution's task becomes increas-
ingly more difficult and complex when it attempts
to trace the money to higher ranking police officers
who did not do the collecting, but participated in
a planned scheme to extort money from many
victims. In such a case, evidence is produced
7 These cases usually involve the indictment of
higher police officials who did not take part in the
actual collection but who received their money from
other officers.
"0 If the officer admits that he was there, he often
denies the payment and provides a reasonable excuse
for not making an arrest. For example, he may claim
that the minor was almost twenty-one and in hisjudgment a warning was sufficient.
81 This is to be expected since police officers generally
have numerous opportunities to appear in court and
are practiced witnesses.
82 For this reason, a defendant who can find a weak-
ness in the victim's identification has a decent chance
of being acquitted.
against the defendants by means of the testimony
of subordinates who.,funneled part of the money
they collected to their superiors. If distribution of
the collected money follows the established hier-
archy of a police department, it is clear that in
order to move up the ladder, testimony must
come from witnesses with significant power and
position in the police district where they served.
The prosecution thus inevitably finds itself in a
very delicate situation. It must grant immunity
or recommend leniency for the officer who is in
charge of collecting money from the victims in
order to prosecute not only his colleagues who do
not take part in the actual collections, but also the
supervising and higher ranking officers.
For example, one case tried in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
disclosed the following pattern of corruption. In
one particular police district, vice officers who
were charged with the enforcement of the liquor
laws participated in a scheme which focused on the
collection of money from various tavern owners in
exchange for protection and better service by the
vice squad. Similarly, regular uniformed officers in
the same district had also formed a "club" and col-
lected money from the same tavern owners for
protection and increased service by 'uniformed
officers. Every tavern owner paid money each
month to the "bagmen" for the vice squad and the
uniformed officers. None of this money, however,
found its way to the district commander who in-
stead received money from organized criminal ele-
ments in the district, and who knowingly allowed
the collections by the vice and uniformed officers
in order to avoid any objection by them that he
was making extra money. In the actual indictment
and trial of the case the government concentrated
on the vice club and the district commander's
knowing acquiescence in their activities. The bag-
man and several other vice officers who occasionally
did the actual collecting from the tavern owners
were granted immunity and testified for the gov-
ernment. The other vice officers who did nothing
but receive their monthly portion of the proceeds for
keeping the club secret and for not harassing the
member tavern owners were defendants in the case,
In Chicago, where vice officers are answerable only
to the commander of the district, an extortion scheme
manned by the vice squad need not involve sergeants,
lieutenants and other uniformed officers. The vice
coordinator (vice officer who supervises the others)
may direct the proceeds to the commander without
the knowledge of the uniformed supervisors.
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'together with the vice coordinator and the district
,commander. The tavern owners could only give
evidence against officers who collected the money
and these officers, almost without exception, were
immunized government witnesses. The accomplice
witnesses played a more direct role in the illegal
activity than many of the defendants. No matter
how many victims testified, their evidence only im-
plicated other government witnesses. The com-
mander of the district was effectively implicated
only by one of the immunized bagmen.8
Under this framework, the structure of corrup-
tion dictates that a district commander can only
'be implicated by the vice coordinator or, perhaps,
one other officer whom he has taken into his con-
fidence.55 The prosecutor has a difficult task be-
cause (1) most of the non-police witnesses cannot
testify against any officers who are defendants, (2)
the credibility of the defendants is pitted against
government police witnesses who are, arguably,
more culpable than they, and (3) the prime target
of the case-the district commander-may be con-
fronted with only one or two witnesses against
him. Because of these weaknesses, the prosecutor
must count on the inferences that may be drawn
by the jury in a conspiracy case, 6 and the effect
that evidence of a massive "shakedown" scheme
will have on a jury's view of the credibility of a
defense by the district commander that this situ-
ation existed in his district without his knowledge.
These last two factors are often sufficient to obtain
conviction.
84 United States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (N.D.Ill.
1973), the district commander did not actually receive
any of the proceeds of the collections from tavern
owners, but nevertheless was indicted and convicted
because he actively allowed the extortion to continue
so that his men would not complain about the money
he was receiving from criminal elements in the district
(e.g. gambling, organized crime, etc.). On the other
hand, the distribution of money may not stop with the
commander of the district but may continue to the
highest levels of the police department.
s5 Indeed, the various vice officers may not even
know the exact source of the money they receive each
month but only know that, in return for receiving it,
they may not make an arrest in certain establishments
without prior approval of the vice coordinator who is
distributing the money.
81Once independent evidence establishes a con-
spiracy, heresay testimony is admissible against all
conspirators. See, e.g. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74(1970); Barly v. State, 233 Ala. 384, 171 So. 729(1937); Reed v. People, 156 Colo. 450, 402 P.2d 68(1965). See also 2 F. WHA.RTON, CRimNAL EvxnxqnE
(12th ed. 1955).
87 See United States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (N.D.
Ill. 1973), where only four out of more than twenty
defendants were acquitted.
In a police corruption case which simply involves
the matching of the credibility of one or two busi-
nessmen against the police officer, the defense
must be simple and straightforward. If, for exam-
ple, the testimony is that money was extorted in
exchange for not making an arrest, the officer can
do little else than deny that the extortion took
place. If the defendant concedes that he was pres-
ent at the scene, then he must offer a rational ex-
planation for not making the arrest, for it is the
failure to arrest which makes the victim's testi-
mony appear credible. In addition, the defendant
will offer evidence of his good reputation in the
community. But character evidence will offer little
strength to the defendant's case if he can assign
no motive for lying to the government witness.
In the more complicated cases, a defendant has
the additional opportunity of attacking the govern-
ment's witnesses who concede that they actively
participated in the unlawful activity for which the
defendant is charged. Defense counsel may argue
that the prosecution's witnesses do have reasons
to lie, either because they have been granted im-
munity or because, if they have entered guilty
pleas, they hope for lighter sentences by cooperat-
ing with the prosecution." Nevertheless, the de-
fense strategy of attacking an accomplice witness's
credibility rarely succeeds. Several reasons account
for the willingness of the jury to accept the testi-
mony of a witness who, but for his cooperation
with the prosecution, would be in the same position
as the defendant. First, once the defendant admits
that he was associated with accomplice witnesses,
he acknowledges that he did not have at least the
good judgment to stay clear of such disreputable
individuals. 5 Second, the jury will probably find
it difficult to belive that a widespread extortion
scheme could take place without those in authority
at least knowing that it was occurring. Finally, the
government's argument, however unrealistic, that
if the accomplice witness lies, he will be prosecuted
for perjury carries great persuasive force.90
83 When a government witness has entered a plea of
guilty prior to trial, his sentence is typically deferred
until after he testifies. This is done to assure his con-
tinued cooperation and to give him the hope that he
will secure a lighter sentence if he favorably impresses
the judge by his testimony.
859 It follows from this that the best defense in an
accomplice witness case is one when the defendant can
testify credibly that he does not even know the govern-
ment's witness or that he did acts inconsistent with
the prosecutor's theory, for example, making arrests of
businessmen who are paying money each month.
90 Even an immunized witness may be prosecuted
for perjury, since immunity relates only to past criminal
conduct. See note 61 supra.
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POLICE CORRUPTION
The judge's most important decision in a police
corruption case concerns his view on whether the
evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to decide if
extortion was committed. If the charge to the jury
adopts the liberalized view of extortion, 9' the de-
9"The indictment and instructions to the jury in
United States v. Braasch, No. 72 (CR 979 (N.D. Il1.
1973) incorporated this broadened interpretation of
Hobbs Act extortion. The pertinent portions of each
were as follows:
indictment
6. That beginning in or about August, 1966, and
continuing thereafter to and including the date of
the filing of this indictment, at Chicago, and at
other places to the Grand Jury unknown, in the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
[naming 24 defendants] defendants herein, and
JOHN A. CELLO, JR., ROBERT W. FISCHER,
SALVATORE M. MASCOLINO and EDWARD
RIFKIN, named herein as co-conspirators but
not as defendants, knowingly, willfully and un-
lawfully did conspire, each with the other and with
divers other persons to the Grand Jury unknown,
to commit extortion, as that term is defined in
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, which
extortion would and did obstruct, delay and affect
commerce, as that term is defined in Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1951, and the move-
ment of alcoholic beverages and other articles in
commerce, in that the defendants and JOHN A.
CELLO, JR., ROBERT W. FISCHER, SALVA-
TORE M. MASCOLINO and EDWARD RIF-
KIN would and did wrongfully use their positions
as Chicago police officers to unlawfully obtain
and cause to be obtained property, to wit: various
sums of money, which money was not due them or
the Chicago Police Department, and which money
would be and was obtained by certain members of
the aforesaid 18th Police District vice squad from
the aforesaid retail liquor dealers and the officers,
agents and employees of said retail liquor dealers,
with their consent, said consent being induced
under color of official right, and which money
would be and thereafter was distributed and
caused to be distributed among the members of the
aforesaid 18th Police District vice squad;
In violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1951.
Instruct ion
Extortion under 'color of official right' means
that property was unlawfully obtained from an-
other person by a public officer, under the color
of his office, and the property so obtained was not
due and owing to the public officer, nor was the
property due and owing to the office he repre-
sented. This type of extortion by a public officer
does not require proof of any specific acts on the
part of the public official demonstrating force,
threats or the use of fear.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Government's evidence has established that cer-
tain members of the conspiracy alleged in Count
I of the indictment used the power and authority
vested in them, by reason of their office as Chicago
police officers, to obtain money from the retail
liquor dealers named in Count I, and that this
money was not due and owing to these police
officers or to the Chicago Police Department, then
fense will be hard pressed to effectively argue that
the payments of money constituted bribery.
Because so much of any police corruption case
involves issues of credibility, the jury is confronted.
with difficult decisions. It must determine without
the benefit of much corroborative evidence who is
telling the truth. For this reason, a witness's de-
meanor, style of speaking and general appearance
are of great significance. Of even more importance
is the jury's view of public officials and its willing-
ness to believe that they are easily corrupted. De-
spite careful screening of jurors in such cases, they
will inevitably reflect the view of the community
about the honesty of its government at the time
of trial.s
CONCLUOSION
In considering the legal and practical issues
which surround an investigation of police corrup-
tion, this article has focused on the investigative
and prosecutorial methods employed to meet the
demands which these investigations have imposed.
A question which has not been explored involves
the political implications of these efforts.
When an investigation is undertaken which has
as its goal the uncovering, through normal criminal
processes, of instances of illegal activity by local
law enforcement officials, it must'be recognized
that the number of those indicted will constitute
only a small percentage of individuals who are in
fact involved in the kinds of activities which are
being investigated. No matter how many individ-
ual officers are actually indicted and convicted in
any investigation, there will be no appreciable
effect on the day-to-day operations and internal
disciplinary mechanism of the police department
unless efforts are made by those directly in charge
of the department to institute major reforms.
Consequently, it is difficult to justify a federal in-
vestigation of police corruption on the basis that
such an investigation will have any long run ef-
fect on the quality or integrity of local law enforce-
ment over which the federal government exercises
little control.
On the other hand, an investigation which pro-
duces significant results may alert the public to
the need for reforming their police department.
I instruct you that that is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the law that money was obtained
by extortion under color of official right.
9In the civil rights cases arising out of the Demo-
cratic Convention of 1968, the United States At-
torney's office in Chicago was unable to secure a single
conviction against the police. But today numerous




When local officials protest that the federal in-
vestigation of police corruption has been com-
menced because of a purely political desire to em-
barass those in power at the local level, the only
required response is that, if wrongdoing has in fact
occurred, the federal government's intrusion into
local affairs could be easily avoided by an alert,
aggressive and honest local law enforcement ap-
paratus. All of the legal and practical methods and
consequences discussed in this article which show
an expansion of the activities of the federal govern-
ment have resulted not so much from the federal
government's desire to investigate local corruption
as from the complete inaction by local officials.
There are in existence, of course, state criminal
laws which can be employed to prosecute corrupt
police officers. If these laws are not enforced, it is
inevitable that another governmental body with
power and authority will eventually take action.
Whether or not that action is precipitated by the
political climate of the time is irrelevant since
adequate enforcement at the local level would
render such action unnecessary. Once a law such
as the Hobbs Act is broadened to include wrong-
doing which had originally been thought to be
within the province of state law enforcement, it
becomes very difficult to avoid continued federal
pressure.
The increasing activity of the federal govern-
ment in investigating those in power at the local
level may cause traditional institutions of the
judicial process to be reexamined. Thus, the use of
immunity and the broad powers of the grand jury
to subpeona witnesses or to command the produc-
tion of books and records, the exercise of which is
subject to little or no court scrutiny, has recently
been questioned by commentators, politicians and
the public. These developments are not new, but
rarely before had they been challenged. When,
however, these tools are employed in an area
which is controversial, strong impetus is given for
reevaluation. In this regard, an investigation of
local corruption may ultimately result in the re-
vision of the apparatus used in that investigation.
It is even conceivable that changes and reforms in
the procedures of investigation will be greater than
the reforms made in the institutions which are the
subject of the investigation.
It is evident, then, that a federal investigation
of local corruption is in many respects a double-
edged sword. The investigation not only affects the
institutions being examined but also the institu-
tions which conduct the inquiry. In the end, both
may undergo change. A police department thor-
oughly investigated and scandalized by indict-
ments and convictions of its officers for extensive
wrongdoing may be forced to revise and update
its operations and its relationship with the public.
Those seeking change may also be changed and,
in the process, a new and more sensible balance
established between federal, state and local insti-
tutions.
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